

OPTIMAL EXECUTION IN A GENERAL ONE-SIDED LIMIT- ORDER BOOK

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Part 1

basic models, problem specification

Outline


- introduction
- basic model
- problem specification
 - Theorem 3.1
 - Theorem 3.2

Introduction

- consider optimal execution over a fixed time interval of a large asset **purchase** in the face of a **one-sided limit-order book**
- assume the ask price (best ask price) is a **continuous martingale with two adjustments** :
 - orders consume a part of the limit-order book, and this increase the ask price for subsequent orders
 - **resilience** in the limit-order book causes the effect of these prior orders to decay over time
- there is **no permanent effect** from the purchase we model, but the temporary effect requires infinite time to completely disappear.

Introduction

- show that the optimal execution strategy **consists of three lump purchases**, and between these lump purchase, the optimal strategy purchases at a **constant rate matched to the limit-order book recovery rate (its resilience)**, so that the ask price minus its martingale component remains constant (section 4)



- Goal : Minimize total cost of purchase

The present paper is inspired by Obizhaeva and Wang (2005)

Review

- Bertsimas & Lo (1998) : Trade on discrete time with permanent / temporary linear price impact, and calculate strategy by using dynamic programming.

$$\min E[\sum_{t=1}^T P_t S_t], \quad P_t = P_{t-1} + \theta S_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad V_t(P_{t-1}, W_t) = \min E_t[P_t S_t + V_{t+1}(P_t, W_{t+1})]$$

- Almgren & Chriss (2000) : Trade on discrete time with permanent / temporary linear price impact. Take variance of cost function into account (risk aversion).

$$\min_x (E(x) + \lambda V(x))$$

$$S_k = S_{k-1} + \sigma \tau^{1/2} \xi_k - \tau g\left(\frac{n_k}{\tau}\right) \rightarrow \tilde{S}_k = S_{k-1} - h\left(\frac{n_k}{\tau}\right)$$

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j} \rightarrow x_j = \frac{\sinh(\kappa(T-t_j))}{\sinh(\kappa T)} X$$

Review

- Obizhaeva & Wang (2005) : price impact of trade will change security's supply and demand (limit-order book, resilience), and the optimal strategy involves both discrete and continuous trades.

$$\text{Proposition 3} \quad J_t = (F_t + s/2)X_t + \lambda X_0 X_t + \alpha_t X_t^2 + \beta_t D_t + \gamma_t D_t^2$$

$$D_t = A_t - V_t - s/2$$

$$x_0 = x_T = \frac{X_0}{\rho T + 2}, \quad \mu_t = \frac{\rho X_0}{\rho T + 2} \quad \forall t \in (0, T)$$

- Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied (2010) : based on Obizhaeva & Wang, with more general shape of limit order book.

Basic Model

Section 2

Basic model

- T : total trading time , $0 \leq t \leq T$
- \bar{X} : total trading volume
- X_t : cumulative purchase up to time t
 - $X_{0-} = 0$, $X_T = \bar{X}$ (nondecreasing, **right continuous**)
- A_t : best ask price in the absence of our trade, which is also continuous nonnegative martingale.

Basic model

- μ : The shadow order book to the right of $A(t)$, which represent the distribution of sell order
 - M is some extended positive real number
 - if B is a measurable subset of $[0, M]$, then at time $t \geq 0$ the number of limit orders with prices in $B + A_t \triangleq \{b + A_t; b \in B\}$ is $\mu(B)$
- $F(x)$: shadow limit-order book, which is **left-continuous** cumulative distribution function
 - $F(x) \triangleq \mu([0, x)), x \geq 0 :$
- $h(x)$: resilience function. Defined on $[0, \infty)$ with $h(0)=0$, and is strictly increasing and locally Lipschitz
- $h(0) = 0, h(\infty) \triangleq \lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} h(x) > \frac{\bar{X}}{T}$

Basic model

- E_t : residual effect process, which is a unique nonnegative **right-continuous** finite-variation adapted process E satisfying :

- $E_t = X_t - \int_0^t h(E_s)ds, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T$


- $E_{0-} = 0, \quad \Delta X_t = \Delta E_t$

- $\Psi(y)$: left continuous inverse of F

- $\Psi(y) \triangleq \sup\{x \geq 0 \mid F(x) < y\}, \quad y > 0$

- $\Psi(0) \triangleq \Psi(0+) = 0 \quad (\because F(x) > 0 \text{ for every } x > 0)$

- Ask price in the presence of large investor is defined to be $A_t + D_t$, where :
 - $D_t \triangleq \Psi(E_t), \quad 0 \leq t \leq T$



Cost function

suppose $A_t \equiv 0$, and no purchase have been made before :



- The cost of purchasing all shares at prices in $[0,x)$:
 - $\rho(x) \triangleq \int_{[0,x)} \xi dF(\xi), \quad x \geq 0$
- The cost of purchasing y shares is :
 - $\phi(y) \triangleq \rho(\Psi(y)) + [y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y), \quad y \geq 0$ and $\phi(0) = 0$
 - first term : purchasing all shares in the interval $[0,x)$
 - second term : lump purchase at price $\Psi(y)$

Example 2 (Modified block order book)

$$\bullet F(x) = \begin{cases} x, & 0 \leq x \leq a \\ a, & a \leq x \leq b \\ x - (b - a), & b \leq x < \infty \end{cases}$$

$$\bullet \Psi(y) = \begin{cases} y, & 0 \leq y \leq a \\ y + b - a, & a < y < \infty \end{cases}$$

$$\bullet F(\Psi(y)) = y \text{ for all } y \geq 0$$



$$\rho(x) \triangleq \int_{[0,x)} \xi dF(\xi), \quad x \geq 0$$

Example 2 (Modified block order book)



- $\rho(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}x^2, & 0 \leq x \leq a \\ \frac{1}{2}a^2, & a \leq x \leq b \\ \frac{1}{2}(x^2 + a^2 - b^2), & b \leq x < \infty \end{cases}$

- $\phi(y) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}y^2, & 0 \leq y \leq a \\ \frac{1}{2}((y+b-a)^2 + a^2 - b^2), & a \leq y < \infty \end{cases}$

- $\phi(y)$ is convex with subdifferential :

- $\partial\phi(y) = \begin{cases} \{y\}, & 0 \leq y < a \\ [a, b], & y = a \\ \{y + b - a\}, & a < y < \infty \end{cases}$


$$\Psi(y) = \begin{cases} y, & 0 \leq y \leq a \\ y + b - a, & a < y < \infty \end{cases}$$



Example 3 (Discrete order book)


- $F(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} I_{(i,\infty)}(x), \quad x \geq 0$
- $\Psi(y) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} I_{(i,\infty)}(y), \quad y \geq 0$
- where $F(j) = j$, $F(j+) = j+1$, $\Psi(j+1) = j$, $\Psi(j+) = j$
- $F(\Psi(j)+) = j$, $\Psi(F(j)+) = j$

density



$F(x)$


- for $k \geq 1$ and $k < y \leq k + 1$, $\Psi(y) = k$



$$\rho(x) \triangleq \int_{[0,x)} \xi dF(\xi), \quad x \geq 0$$

Example 3 (Discrete order book)

- $\rho(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} i I_{(i,\infty)}(x)$
 - in particular, $\rho(0) = 0$
 - and for integers $k \geq 1$ and $k - 1 < x \leq k$, $\rho(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} i = \frac{k(k-1)}{2}$
- $\phi(y) = \rho(\Psi(y)) + [y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y)$
 - $\rho(\Psi(y)) = \frac{k(k-1)}{2}$ (for $k < y \leq k + 1$, $\Psi(y) = k$)
 - lump purchase : $[y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y) = k(y-k)$
 - we get : $\phi(y) = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} k \left(y - \frac{1}{2}k - \frac{1}{2} \right) I_{(k,k+1]}(y)$
- ϕ is convex, with differential :
 - $\partial\phi(y) = [\Psi(y), \Psi(y+)]$, for all $y \geq 0$
 - $\phi'(y) = \Psi(y) = k$, for all $y \geq 0$



$$\phi(y) \triangleq \rho(\Psi(y)) + [y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y)$$

Define Cost & strategy

$$E_t = X_t - \int_0^t h(E_s) ds,$$

- decompose strategy X into its continuous and pure jump parts :

- $X_t = X_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq s \leq t} \Delta X_s$

- investor pays price $A_t D_t$ for infinitesimal purchase at time t

- total cost of these purchase : $\int_0^T (A_t + D_t) dX_t^c$

- for lump purchase :


- $\Delta X_t = \Delta E_t$

- cost of purchase ΔX_t : $A_t \Delta X_t + \phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})$

- total cost function :

- $C(X) = \int_0^T (A_t + D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [A_t \Delta X_t + \phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})]$

$$= \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \int_{[0,T]} A_t dX_t$$



Our Goal is to determine strategy X that minimizes $E[C(X)]$

Problem simplifications

Section 3 (Rewrite cost function)

Rewrite cost function

- $C(X) = \int_0^T (A_t + D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [A_t \Delta X_t + \phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})]$
 $= \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \int_{[0,T]} A_t dX_t$
- By integration by parts :
 - $\int_{[0,T]} A_t dX_t = (A_t X_t|_0^T) - \int_0^T (X_t) dA_t = A_T X_T - A_0 X_0 - \int_0^T (X_t) dA_t$
 - and $\because E(\int_0^T (X_t) dA_t) = 0$ (**martingale**), $E(A_T X_T) = \bar{X} A_0$, $E(A_0 X_0) = 0$
 $\therefore EC(X) = \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \bar{X} A_0$
- minimization of $C(X)$ is equal to $\min(\int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})])$
- 2 theorems for minimization problem simplification

$$C(X) = \int_0^T (A_t + D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [A_t \Delta X_t + \phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})]$$

$$= \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \int_{[0,T]} A_t dX_t$$

- Theorem 3.1
- do not allow the agent to make intermediate sells in order to achieve the ultimate \bar{X} shares, because doing so would not decrease the cost
 - proof :

suppose the agent has strategy Y , which is non-decreasing right-continuous adapted process with $Y_{0-} = 0$, $X_T - Y_T = \bar{X}$ (**didn't modeled the limit buy order book**) :

$$C(X,Y) \geq \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \int_{[0,T]} A_t dX_t - \int_{[0,T]} A_t dY_t$$

Theorem 3.1

- with both buy / sell strategy :

$$C(X, Y) \geq \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \int_{[0, T]} A_t dX_t - \int_{[0, T]} A_t dY_t$$

- By integration by parts :

- $\int_{[0, T]} A_t dX_t - \int_{[0, T]} A_t dY_t = A_T (X_T - Y_T) - A_0 (X_{0-} - Y_{0-}) - \int_0^T (X_t - Y_t) dA_t$

- and $E(\int_0^T (X_t - Y_t) dA_t) = 0$ (**martingale**), so

$$EC(X, Y) \geq E \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + E \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] + \bar{X} A_0 \geq EC(X)$$

Theorem 3.2

- Assume without loss of generality that $A_t \equiv 0$, the cost of using strategy $X_t, 0 \leq t \leq T$:

$$C(X) = \int_0^T (D_t) dX_t^c + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})] = \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T D_t h(E_t) dt$$

- proof.
 - step 1 : $\partial\phi(y) = [\Psi(y), \Psi(y+)]$
 - step 2 : $\phi(E_T) = \int_0^T D_t dX_t^c - \int_0^T D_t h(E_t) dt + \sum_{0 \leq t \leq T} [\phi(E_t) - \phi(E_{t-})]$

Part 2

Strategy solution, Conclusion

Outline

- Strategy solution
 - Type A strategy
 - Type B strategy
- Conclusion

Strategy

Type A & Type B

$$E_t = X_t - \int_0^t h(E_s)ds, \quad 0 \leq t \leq T$$

$\Psi(y)$: left continuous inverse of F

Optimization Problem

- Goal : minimize the expected cost $\phi(E_T) + \int_0^T D_t h(E_t)dt$


- Two solution :

- Type B (the optimal one):

$X_0 = E_0$, then buys $dX_t = h(E_0)dt$ up to time t_0 , then buys another lump at time t_0 , subsequently trades again at a constant rate $dX_t = h(E_{t_0})dt$ until time T , and finally buy the remaining shares at T .

- Type A (special case of Type B):

if $g(y) \triangleq y\Psi(h^{-1}(y))$ is convex, then there exists a Type A purchasing strategy that minimizes $C(X)$ over all purchasing strategies X , where the purchase at time t_0 consists of 0 shares.




Type A Strategy

- Goal : minimize the expected cost $\phi(E_T) + \int_0^T D_t h(E_t) dt$
 - Type A (special case of Type B):
 - if $g(y) \triangleq y\Psi(h^{-1}(y))$ is convex, then there exists a Type A purchasing strategy that minimizes $C(X)$ over all purchasing strategies X , where the purchase at time t_0 consists of 0 shares.
 - the cost strategy can be rewrite :
 - $C(X) = \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T D_t h(E_t) dt = \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T g(h(E_t)) dt$, where $g(y) \triangleq y\Psi(h^{-1}(y))$
 - $C(X^A) = \phi(E_T^A) + Tg\left(h(X_0^A)\right) = \phi(E_T^A) + Tg\left(h\left(h^{-1}\left(\frac{\bar{X}-E_T^A}{T}\right)\right)\right) = \phi(E_T^A) + Tg\left(\frac{\bar{X}-E_T^A}{T}\right)$
 - only when g is convex, we can **use Jensen's inequality** to prove :
 - $\phi(E_T) + \int_0^T g(h(E_t)) dt \geq \phi(E_T) + Tg\left(\frac{\bar{X}-E_T}{T}\right)$
 - define $G(e) = \phi(e) + Tg\left(\frac{\bar{X}-e}{T}\right)$, we can find the $e^*(E_T^A)$ that minimize G
 - $X_0^A = h^{-1}\left(\frac{\bar{X}-E_T^A}{T}\right)$
 - purchase continuously with rate $h(X_0^A)$
 - $X_T^A = \bar{X} - X_0^A - h(X_0^A)T$

Type B strategy

- In the absence of the assumption that g is convex, there exists a Type B purchasing strategy that minimizes $C(X)$ over all purchasing strategies X .
 - define **convex hull of g** , defined by :
 - $\hat{g}(y) \triangleq \sup\{l(y) : l \text{ is an affine function and } l(\eta) \leq g(\eta) \forall \eta \in [0, \bar{Y}]\}$
 - $\hat{g}(0) = g(0) = 0, \hat{g}(\bar{Y}) = g(\bar{Y})$
 - if $y^* \in (0, \bar{Y})$ which satisfies $\hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$, then exists unique l below g
 - $0 \leq \alpha < y^* < \beta \leq \bar{Y}$:
$$l(\alpha) = \hat{g}(\alpha) = g(\alpha), l(\beta) = \hat{g}(\beta) = g(\beta)$$
$$l(y) = \hat{g}(y) < g(y), \quad \alpha < y < \beta$$
- (prove in Appendix C)



$$C(X) = \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T g(h(E_t))dt$$

Type B strategy

- $\hat{C}(X) \triangleq \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T \hat{g}(h(E_t))dt$
- we obviously have $\hat{C}(X) \leq C(X)$
- By Jensen's Inequality (12_20 pg, 14) :
 - $\hat{C}(X) \geq \phi(E_T) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X}-E_T}{T}\right)$
- This lead us to consider minimization of the function \hat{G} :
 - $\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X}-e}{T}\right)$
- prove that :
 - $C(X^B) = \hat{G}(e^*)$

$$C(X) = \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T g(h(E_t))dt$$

$$\hat{C}(X) \triangleq \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T \hat{g}(h(E_t))dt$$

$$g(y) \triangleq y\Psi(h^{-1}(y))$$

Type B strategy

- $C(X^B) = \hat{G}(e^*) = \phi(e^*) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X}-e^*}{T}\right)$, the lower bound of \hat{C} and C
- $y^* = \frac{\bar{X}-e^*}{T}$, $x^* = h^{-1}(y^*) = X_0^A$ (12_20 pg.12)
- discuss 2 cases :
 - case 1 : y^* satisfy $\hat{g}(y^*) = g(y^*)$, can be regarded as Type A
 - case 2 : y^* satisfy $\hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$

Case 1 of Type B ($\hat{g}(y^*) = g(y^*)$)

recall Type A strategy :

- define the range of E_T^A :
 - $k(x) \triangleq x + h(x)T$ (total trade volume before last lump purchase ΔX_T^A)
 - there exists a unique $\bar{e} \in (0, \bar{X})$ such that $k(\bar{e}) = \bar{X}$
 - therefore, feasible strategy of Type A : $0 \leq X_0^A \leq \bar{e}$
 - $\because E_T^A = \bar{X} - h(X_0^A)T, \therefore \bar{e} \leq E_T^A \leq \bar{X}$
- the minimization problem we consider :
 - $G(e) = \phi(e) + Tg\left(\frac{\bar{X}-e}{T}\right)$
- therefore, the minimum of convex function G over $[0, \bar{X}]$ is obtained in $[\bar{e}, \bar{X}]$
- but here $\hat{g}(\bar{e}) \leq g(\bar{e})$, so we need to prove $e^* \geq \bar{e}$

$$y^* = \frac{\bar{X} - e^*}{T}, \quad x^* = h^{-1}(y^*)$$

$$k(x) \triangleq x + h(x)T$$

$$k(\bar{e}) = \bar{X}$$

$$\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T}\right)$$


Case 1 of Type B

- case $x^* = 0$:
 - $y^* = 0, e^* = \bar{X}$
- case $x^* > 0$:
 - subcase $0 < x^* \leq F(0+)$ (1/17_pg. 19-20)
 - subcase $x^* > F(0+)$ (1/17_pg. 21-22)
- conclusion:
 - when $\hat{g}(y^*) = g(y^*)$, we can use the Type A strategy
 - with $X_0^A = x^*$ and $E_T^A = e^*$

$$E_t = X_t - \int_0^t h(E_s)ds,$$

Case 2 of Type B

- $\hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$
- define $t_0 \in (0, T)$ by $t_0 = \frac{(\beta - y^*)T}{\beta - \alpha}$
 - so that $\alpha t_0 + \beta(T - t_0) = y^*T$
- consider the Type B strategy that :
 - makes an initial strategy $X_0^B = h^{-1}(\alpha)$
 - then purchase at rate $dX_t^B = \alpha dt$, for $0 \leq t < t_0$ ($E_t^B = h^{-1}(\alpha)$)
 - follow with the purchase $\Delta X_{t_0}^B = h^{-1}(\beta) - h^{-1}(\alpha)$ at time t_0
 - then purchase at rate $dX_t^B = \beta dt$, for $t_0 \leq t < T$ ($E_t^B = h^{-1}(\beta)$)
 - final lump purchase $\bar{X} - X_{T-}^\beta$ at time T
- we will show that X^B is the optimal strategy



$$t_0 = \frac{(\beta - y^*)T}{\beta - \alpha} \rightarrow \alpha t_0 + \beta(T - t_0) = y^* T$$

$$y^* = \frac{\bar{X} - e^*}{T}$$

Case 2 of Type B

- 2 parts of the proof

- **X^B is optimal** with : $X_t^B = \begin{cases} h^{-1}(\alpha) + \alpha t, & 0 \leq t < t_0, \\ h^{-1}(\beta) + \alpha t_0 + \beta(t - t_0), & t_0 \leq t < T \\ \bar{X}, & t = T \end{cases}$

- $\Delta X_T^B = \bar{X} - h^{-1}(\beta) - \alpha t_0 - \beta(t - t_0)$
 $= \bar{X} - h^{-1}(\beta) - y^* T$
 $= e^* - h^{-1}(\beta)$

also need to prove $h^{-1}(\beta) \leq e^*$

$$C(X) = \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T g(h(E_t))dt$$

X^B is optimal

- $\hat{C}(X) \triangleq \phi(E_T) + \int_0^T \hat{g}(h(E_t))dt$
- we obviously have $\hat{C}(X) \leq C(X)$
- By Jensen's Inequality (12_20 pg, 14) :
 - $\hat{C}(X) \geq \phi(E_T) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X} - E_T}{T}\right)$
- This lead us to consider minimization of the function \hat{G} :
 - $\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T}\right)$
- prove that :
 - $C(X^B) = \hat{G}(e^*)$


X^B is optimal

- $E_T^B = E_{T-}^B + \Delta E_T^B = h^{-1}(\beta) + \Delta X_T^B = e^*$
- $C(X^B) = \phi(E_T^B) + \int_0^T g(h(E_t^B)) dt$
 $= \phi(e^*) + g(\alpha)t_0 + g(\beta)(T - t_0)$
 $= \phi(e^*) + l(\alpha)t_0 + l(\beta)(T - t_0)$
 $= \phi(e^*) + Tl\left(\frac{\alpha t_0 + \beta(T - t_0)}{T}\right)$
 $= \phi(e^*) + Tl(y^*)$
 $= \phi(e^*) + T\hat{g}(y^*)$
 $= \hat{G}(e^*)$

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta X_T^B &= \bar{X} - h^{-1}(\beta) - \alpha t_0 - \beta(T - t_0) \\ &= \bar{X} - h^{-1}(\beta) - y^*T \\ &= e^* - h^{-1}(\beta)\end{aligned}$$

$$t_0 = \frac{(\beta - y^*)T}{\beta - \alpha} \rightarrow \alpha t_0 + \beta(T - t_0) = y^*T$$

$g(y)$



if $y^* \in (0, \bar{Y})$ which satisfies $\hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$, then exists unique l below g :
 $0 \leq \alpha < y^* < \beta \leq \bar{Y}$
 $l(\alpha) = \hat{g}(\alpha) = g(\alpha), l(\beta) = \hat{g}(\beta) = g(\beta)$
 $l(y) = \hat{g}(y) < g(y), \alpha < y < \beta$

$$g(y) \triangleq y\Psi(h^{-1}(y))$$

$$y^* = \frac{\bar{X} - e^*}{T}$$


$$\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T}\right)$$

Cost func 的 lower bound

$$h^{-1}(\beta) \leq e^*$$

- for all $e \in (e^*, \bar{X})$, $D^+ \hat{G}(e) > 0$
- assume e is greater than but sufficiently close to e^* :
 - $\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T}$ is in (α, y^*) , $\therefore \hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$ and $y^* = \frac{\bar{X} - e^*}{T}$
 - where \hat{g} is linear with slope $\frac{g(\beta) - g(\alpha)}{\beta - \alpha}$, $\therefore l(y) = \hat{g}(y) < g(y)$, $\alpha < y < \beta$
- proof :

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &< D^+ \hat{G}(e) \\ &= D^+ \Phi(e+) - D^- \hat{g}(y) \Big|_{y=\frac{\bar{X}-e}{T}} \\ &= \psi(e+) - \frac{g(\beta) - g(\alpha)}{\beta - \alpha} \\ &= \psi(e+) - \frac{\beta \psi(h^{-1}(\beta)) - \alpha \psi(h^{-1}(\alpha))}{\beta - \alpha} \\ &\leq \psi(e+) - \frac{\beta \psi(h^{-1}(\beta)) - \alpha \psi(h^{-1}(\beta))}{\beta - \alpha} \\ &= \psi(e+) - \psi(h^{-1}(\beta)). \end{aligned}$$



- $\psi(e+) > \psi(h^{-1}(\beta))$ for all greater than but sufficiently close to e^* implies $h^{-1}(\beta) \leq e^*$


Example

Discrete order book

Example 3 (Discrete order book)


- $F(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} I_{(i,\infty)}(x), \quad x \geq 0$
- $\Psi(y) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} I_{(i,\infty)}(y), \quad y \geq 0$
- where $F(j) = j$, $F(j+) = j+1$, $\Psi(j+1) = j$, $\Psi(j+) = j$
- $F(\Psi(j)+) = j$, $\Psi(F(j)+) = j$

density



$F(x)$

- **for $k \geq 1$ and $k < y \leq k + 1$, $\Psi(y) = k$**




$$\rho(x) \triangleq \int_{[0,x)} \xi dF(\xi), \quad x \geq 0$$

$$\phi(y) \triangleq \rho(\Psi(y)) + [y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y)$$

Example 3 (Discrete order book)

- $\rho(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} i I_{(i,\infty)}(x)$
 - in particular, $\rho(0) = 0$
 - and for integers $k \geq 1$ and $k-1 < x \leq k$, $\rho(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} i = \frac{k(k-1)}{2}$
- $\phi(y) = \rho(\Psi(y)) + [y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y)$
 - $\rho(\Psi(y)) = \frac{k(k-1)}{2}$ ($\Psi(y) = k$, for $k < y \leq k+1$)
 - lump purchase : $[y - F(\Psi(y))] \Psi(y) = k(y-k)$
 - we get : $\phi(y) = \frac{k(k-1)}{2} + k(y-k)$
- ϕ is convex, with differential :
 - $\partial\phi(y) = [\Psi(y), \Psi(y+)]$, for all $y \geq 0$
 - $\phi'(y) = \Psi(y) = k$, for all $y \geq 0$



Example of Type B (Discrete order book)


- In order to illustrate different cases of purchasing strategies, we assume :
 - $h(x) = x$ and $T = 1$
 - The function \hat{G} is minimized over to $[0, \bar{X}]$ at e^* if and only if :
 - $0 \in \partial \hat{G}(e^*) = \partial \phi(e^*) - \partial \hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*)$
 - which is equivalent to $\partial \phi(e^*) \cap \partial \hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*) \neq \emptyset$
- $$\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T \hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T}\right)$$

convex hull and affine function

$$g(y) \triangleq y\Psi(h^{-1}(y))$$

$$\Psi(y) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} I_{(i,\infty)}(y)$$

for $k \geq 1$ and $k < y \leq k + 1$, $\Psi(y) = k$



1. if $y^* \in (0, \bar{Y})$ which satisfies $\hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$, then exists unique l below g :
 $0 \leq \alpha < y^* < \beta \leq \bar{Y}$
 $l(\alpha) = \hat{g}(\alpha) = g(\alpha), l(\beta) = \hat{g}(\beta) = g(\beta)$
 $l(y) = \hat{g}(y) < g(y), \alpha < y < \beta$
For $\alpha < y^* < \beta$, we have $l(y^*) = \hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$

2. $g(y) = ky$, for integer $k \geq 0$ and $k < y \leq k + 1$
in particular, $g(k) = (k - 1)k$

3. The convex hull of g interpolates linearly between $(k, (k-1)k)$ and $(k+1, k(k+1))$, i.e. $\hat{g}(y) = k(2y - (k + 1))$

$$\phi(y) = \frac{k(k-1)}{2} + k(y-k) = k\left(y - \frac{1}{2}k - \frac{1}{2}\right)$$


Example of Type B (Discrete order book)

$$\hat{g}(y) = k(2y - (k + 1))$$

- find e^* where $\partial\phi(e^*) \cap \partial\hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*) \neq \emptyset$, and for integers $k \geq 0$:

$$\partial\phi(y) = \begin{cases} \{0\}, & y = 0 \\ [k-1, k], & y = k \\ \{k\}, & k < y < k+1 \end{cases}$$

$$\partial\hat{g}(y) = \begin{cases} \{0\}, & y = 0 \\ [2(k-1), 2k], & y = k \\ \{2k\}, & k < y < k+1 \end{cases}$$



$$\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T\hat{g}\left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T}\right)$$

Example of Type B (Discrete order book)

- we assume :
 - $h(x) = x$
 - $T = 1$
- we define k^* to be the largest integer less than or equal to $\frac{\bar{X}}{3}$, so that :
 - $3k^* \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 3$
- we divide the analysis into three cases:
 - Case A : $3k^* \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 1$
 - Case B : $3k^* + 1 \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 2$

$$\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T \hat{g} \left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T} \right)$$

Case A

- Case A : $3k^* \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 1$
- we define $e^* = \bar{X} - k^*$, so that $2k^* \leq e^* < 2k^* + 1$ and $k^* = \bar{X} - e^*$
- then :
 - $\partial\phi(e^*) \ni 2k^*$
 - $\partial\hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*) = [2(k^* - 1), 2k^*]$
- so the intersection of $\partial\phi(e^*)$ and $\partial\hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*)$ is nonempty, as desired, with $e^* = \bar{X} - k^*$

$$\partial\phi(y) = \begin{cases} \{0\}, & y = 0 \\ [k-1, k], & y = k \\ \{k\}, & k < y < k+1 \end{cases}$$

$$\partial\hat{g}(y) = \begin{cases} \{0\}, & y = 0 \\ [2(k-1), 2k], & y = k \\ \{2k\}, & k < y < k+1 \end{cases}$$


$$y^* = \frac{\bar{X} - e^*}{T}$$

$$x^* = h^{-1}(y^*) = X_0^A$$

$$E_t = X_t - \int_0^t h(E_s)ds,$$

Case A

- we have $e^* = \bar{X} - k^*$
 - $x^* = y^* = k^*$ (an integer)
 - $\hat{g}(y^*) = g(y^*)$, which is Type A strategy
- two cases:
 - if $k^* = 0$, first subcase of Case1 ($x < F(0+)$):
 - $x^* = k^* = 0$, initial lump purchase : 0 shares
 - do nothing until time T
 - with final lump purchase T : \bar{X}
 - if $k^* > 0$:
 - $x^* = k^* > 0$, initial lump purchase : k^* shares
 - purchase continuously at rate k^* in $(0, T)$, to keep $E_t = k^*$ and $D_t = \Psi(E_t) = k^* - 1$
 - with final lump purchase T : $\bar{X} - 2k^*$



$$\hat{G}(e) = \phi(e) + T \hat{g} \left(\frac{\bar{X} - e}{T} \right)$$

Case B

- Case B : $3k^* + 1 \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 2$
- we define $e^* = 2k^* + 1$, so that $k^* < \bar{X} - e^* < k^* + 1$
- then :
 - $\partial\phi(e^*) = [2k^*, 2k^* + 1]$
 - $\partial\hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*) \ni 2k^*$
- so the intersection of $\partial\phi(e^*)$ and $\partial\hat{g}(\bar{X} - e^*)$ is nonempty, as desired, with $e^* = 2k^* + 1$

$$\partial\phi(y) = \begin{cases} \{0\}, & y = 0 \\ [k-1, k], & y = k \\ \{k\}, & k < y < k+1 \end{cases}$$

$$\partial\hat{g}(y) = \begin{cases} \{0\}, & y = 0 \\ [2(k-1), 2k], & y = k \\ \{2k\}, & k < y < k+1 \end{cases}$$

$$y^* = \frac{\bar{X} - e^*}{T}$$


$$x^* = h^{-1}(y^*) = X_0^A$$

$$E_t = X_t - \int_0^t h(E_s)ds,$$

$$\Psi(y) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} I_{(i,\infty)}(y)$$

Case B

- we have $e^* = 2k^* + 1$
 - $x^* = y^* = \bar{X} - e^*$
 - $k^* \leq y^* < k^* + 1$, so $\hat{g}(y^*) < g(y^*)$, which is Type B strategy
- By Type B strategy, we have :
 - $\alpha = k^*$
 - $\beta = k^* + 1$
 - $t_0 = \frac{(\beta - y^*)T}{\beta - \alpha} = (\beta - y^*) = k^* + 1 - \bar{X} - e^* = 3k^* + 2 - \bar{X}$
- the strategy :
 - initial lump purchase : $X_0^B = h^{-1}(\alpha) = k^*$
 - purchases continuously at rate k^* in $(0, t_0)$, ($E_t = k^*$ and $D_t = \Psi(E_t) = k^* - 1$)
 - intermediate lump purchase : $\Delta X_{t_0}^B = h^{-1}(\beta) - h^{-1}(\alpha) = \beta - \alpha = 1$
 - purchases continuously at rate k^*+1 in $(t_0, 1)$, ($E_t = k^* + 1$ and $D_t = \Psi(E_t) = k^*$)
 - final lump purchase : $X_T^B = k^*$



implementation


Adidas, 7/1 (simple)

Measure of LOB

- Adidas, 7/1, ask-side LOB (partial)

| Date | Ask1 | Ask2 | Ask3 | Ask4 | Ask5 | Ask6 | Ask7 | Ask8 | Ask9 | Ask10 | Ask11 | Ask12 | Ask13 | Ask14 | Ask15 | Ask16 | Ask17 | Ask18 | Ask19 | Ask20 |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------|
| 32579015 | 3.94E+01 | 3.95E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.01E+01 | 4.01E+01 | 4.01E+01 | |
| 32579017 | 3.94E+01 | 3.95E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.01E+01 | 4.01E+01 | |
| 32579021 | 3.94E+01 | 3.94E+01 | 3.95E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.00E+01 | |
| 32579070 | 3.94E+01 | 3.94E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.01E+01 | 4.01E+01 | |
| 32579071 | 3.94E+01 | 3.94E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.01E+01 | 4.01E+01 | |
| 32579072 | 3.94E+01 | 3.94E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.96E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.97E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.98E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 3.99E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.00E+01 | 4.01E+01 | |

| Date | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q5 | Q6 | Q7 | Q8 | Q9 | Q10 | Q11 | Q12 | Q13 | Q14 | Q15 | Q16 | Q17 | Q18 | Q19 | Q20 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|-----|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|
| 32579015 | 3174 | 3000 | 452 | 2000 | 731 | 483 | 205 | 373 | 469 | 1000 | 132 | 496 | 374 | 12 | 509 | 379 | 511 | 305 | 379 | 545 |
| 32579017 | 3174 | 3000 | 50 | 452 | 2000 | 731 | 483 | 205 | 373 | 469 | 1000 | 132 | 496 | 374 | 12 | 509 | 379 | 511 | 305 | 379 |
| 32579021 | 93 | 3174 | 3000 | 50 | 452 | 2000 | 731 | 483 | 205 | 373 | 469 | 1000 | 132 | 496 | 374 | 12 | 509 | 379 | 511 | 305 |
| 32579070 | 93 | 3174 | 50 | 452 | 2000 | 731 | 483 | 205 | 373 | 469 | 1000 | 132 | 496 | 374 | 12 | 509 | 379 | 511 | 305 | 379 |
| 32579071 | 93 | 3174 | 50 | 452 | 2000 | 731 | 483 | 205 | 373 | 469 | 1000 | 132 | 496 | 374 | 12 | 509 | 379 | 511 | 4908 | 379 |
| 32579072 | 93 | 3174 | 50 | 452 | 2000 | 731 | 483 | 2500 | 205 | 373 | 469 | 1000 | 132 | 496 | 374 | 12 | 509 | 379 | 511 | 4908 |




Measure of LOB

- Evolution of cumulative volume in LOB


Ask side

evolution of cummulative volume in LOB




Bid side

evolution of cummulative volume in LOB



both side

evolution of cummulative volume in LOB





* only first 100 timestamps of 7/1

Measure of LOB

- observation
 - less market impact, less purchasing cost
- implementation
 - Adidas, 7/1, ask-side LOB
 - use “Discrete order book” (Example 3 in paper) as a simple example
 - fixed average volume with discrete price

implementation


- assume $T = 1, h(x) = x$
- $A_{0-} = 3918$ ($39.18 * 100$)
 - price (x) $\rightarrow 100 * \text{price}$
 - 3918, 3919, 3920...
- density ~ 1167 (average volume of ask-side LOB)
 - volume (y, \bar{X}) $\rightarrow \text{volume}/1167$
- we assume :
 - $\bar{X} = 4 * 10^3$ (1167 shares)



* average of 84985 LOB data

implementation

- $\bar{X} = 4 * 10^3$ (1167 shares)
- we define k^* to be the largest integer less than or equal to $\frac{\bar{X}}{3}$, so that :
 - $3k^* \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 3$
 - $k^* = 1333$ and $\bar{X} = 3k^* + 1$
- Case B : $3k^* + 1 \leq \bar{X} < 3k^* + 2$
- $\alpha = k^* = 1333$
 - $\beta = k^* + 1 = 1334$
 - $t_0 = 3k^* + 2 - \bar{X} = 1$
- strategy
 - $X_0^A = 1333$
 - purchase continuously at rate $k^* = 1333$
 - $X_T^A = \bar{X} - 2k^* = 1334$



performance

- strategy
 - $X_0^A = 1333$
 - purchase continuously at rate $k^* = 1333$
 - $X_T^A = \bar{X} - 2k^* = 1334$ with $E_T^A = 2667$
- comparison
 - $X_0^A = 1000$
 - purchase continuously at rate $k^* = 1000$
 - $X_T^A = \bar{X} - 2k^* = 1000$ with $E_T^A = 3000$
- performance (ignore fixed costs)
 - our strategy : $C(X) = \phi(2667) + Tg(1333) = \mathbf{5330667}$
 - comparison : $C(X) = \phi(3000) + Tg(1000) = \mathbf{5497500}$

Conclusion

- Type A strategy is one kind of Type B strategy with the intermediate purchase is of size 0
- with density or cdf of LOB and resilience pattern :
 - we can derive the cost function
 - if the cost function is convex : Type A strategy
 - if the cost function isn't convex : Type B strategy
- no risk aversion in this model
 - only focus on minimizing $E(C(X))$ of the execution
- no discussion about how to use the model in practice
 - measure of F (cdf of LOB), h (resilience function)
- no discrete-time version
 - unlike Obizhaeva & Wang (2005) , Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied (2010)

Ref.

- https://www.pathlms.com/siam/courses/2725/sections/3581/video_presentations/29246
- <https://www.math.cmu.edu/users/shreve/OptimalExecution.pdf>